A
priest that pronounces a couple “husband and wife” can be said to
be involved in two activities: the simple uttering of words, and
actually binding two people into marriage. If the best man were to
shove the priest aside and utter the same words, he is considered to
be involved only with the
simple uttering of words, but not the marrying of the bride and
groom. What is it that gives the priest's words binding power? There
are various instances of social convention in which words have
binding power, and as Judith Butler notes,1
certain utterances bind a person to shame. I will present an analysis
of Butler's view, and I'll attempt to show that while she offers a
good theory of how certain utterances by authoritative figures
acquire binding power, there is little explanation as to how
non-authoritative citizens seem to execute the same kind of binding
power as it pertains to slurs and derogatory remarks. Examining
Butler's position will help to establish the authoritative aspect of
performative
utterances, and I will turn to Nietzsche to provide a hypothesis of
how non-authoritative citizens also exhibit binding power.
Performative Speech Acts
Austin
defines performatives as those utterances that when stated one is not
describing what one is doing, nor is one simply stating what one is
doing, rather, one is performing said action; it
is to do it.2
When a priest states “I pronounce you...”, the utterance is
neither a description, nor is it stating what it is the priest is
doing, but the given phrase is
to bind a couple in marriage. The success of a performative act
depends on whether the act proceeds under certain circumstances:
there must exist an accepted conventional procedure (certain persons
uttering certain words in a certain context), the given procedure is
executed correctly and completely, and the appropriate thoughts and
feelings must accompany the act as well as the appropriate subsequent
behavior.
Citation Of the Law
Butler
is not adhering to all of the circumstances of performativity as she
does not seem to express concern of whether the appropriate thoughts
and feelings accompany a performative act for it to be successful. On
the contrary, she seeks to dispense with the notion that a subject is
what construes the power of performativity. This is not to say that
thoughts and feelings aren't involved, but that a performative does
not achieve success through a self-contemplative process in which a
judge, for example, considers the situation, and by an instance of
will, pronounces someone to be guilty or innocent: it is not a
subject that establishes that a judge's words confer a sentence onto
a guilty party. Austin's first condition states that there must exist
an accepted conventional procedure for a performative to work, and in
the case of a judge's sentence, Butler thinks that what the judge
utters has binding power only if the judge cites
the law. In addition to this, it must be the case that prior to the
current trial, there must be a conventional
legacy
by which current “activity” emerges in the context of a chain of
binding conventions: a trial cannot proceed in its contemporary
fashion unless trials have successfully proceeded as such in the
past, and the current trial mimics, or reiterates
former trials.
We'll
return to the idea of dispensing with the subject later. Sticking
with citation, particular statements a judge utters acquire a binding
force from previous
discourse
in the practices of law where other such successful
performative acts were performed. Citing serves as an invocation
of convention—a
discursive practice that appeals to prior authoritative sets of
practices, to a conventional legacy. If not for these prior,
particular, law oriented linguistic activities concerning matters of
authority and lawful citizenship, then a judge would be in no
position for his utterances to have any binding power over the
affairs of people in court.
Given
that certain performatives have been repeated by certain persons on
numerous occasions in the past, they have accumulated a force of
authority and normativity over time. Whether it be the verdict of a
judge, or the vows in marriage, either, as a performative act, gets
its force due to an appeal to prior exercises that have been repeated
on numerous occasions. Seeing as the best man in a wedding has not
been the one to utter vows in the past, his butting in seems uncanny,
and no one takes him seriously. Another of Austin's conditions of
success is that the appropriate subsequent behavior compliments the
performative. It is the string of successful
performatives over time that constitutes conventional legacy; the
best man has had no such success in the past, so he is condemned to
being a bored spectator rather than the one doing the binding.
Femininity Is Not a Choice
Remaining
with the wedding example, the best man cannot will it that his
utterances having binding power because there is no historical force
to support him, due to which his attempt will not be followed by the
appropriate subsequent behavior. Instead, he will become the victim
of ridicule for disrupting the ceremony. There are ways to fail in
the face of conventional legacy, acts that are thought to disrupt, or
not coincide with, the chain. In the case of the marriage ceremony,
Butler thinks that the performative nature of the ceremony to bind
two people together also establishes that the performatives involved
succeed only if the players are of a particular sort. A priest cannot
marry anyone, it must be the case that it be a bride
and groom.
Butler explains how this sense of performative success regarding
marriage ceremonies also establishes taboo activity, acts that do not
meet the conditions of performative success. In this instance it's
the sex of the two persons to be wed. The performative nature of the
marriage ceremony, then, establishes a heterosexualization of social
bonds between people.
The conventional legacy of heterosexual marriage establishes a
shaming taboo that “queers” all those who contradict the
convention. “Queer”, then, serves as an insult, and similar to
how a judge or priest cites prior authoritative practices in order
for their utterances to have binding force, the insulting nature of
“queer” gets its performative force by referencing historical
operation: how it has been used to indicate contradiction to
convention in the past. A part of the conventionality of the marriage
ceremony is that it harmonizes two people in such a way that it
produces jubilant feelings amongst attendees. Anyone who is seen as
disruptive to such conventionality is outcast and ridiculed, and thus
“queering” has developed as an instance of shame.
In
a certain sense, one can infer that the past determines the future,
and that all present conduct is the result of conventional legacy.
There are those who oppose such an inference, and believe that
one can create oneself in the moment, free from history and
surpassing convention. Language, by this standard, appeals to a
“will” or “choice”, and does not constitute a history of
discourse. Sartre is a proponent of such a notion, and in his
existentialism asserts that “existence precedes essence,” from
which we are meant to understand that one creates who one is in each
moment of one's life by means of choice.3
Sartre thought that if there is one truth to man it is that he is a
conscience subject capable of overcoming history by conscientiously
considering alternative actions. Butler believes this to be erroneous
in that identity categories do not surpass historical discourse.
There is no term, or statement, that can function performatively
without a preceding historical force—no binding can occur without
there being past instances for one to cite. In order to identify as
some gender, that is, to be able to be bound to what one utters,
there has to have been instances in the past where doing so bound
others to respective identities.
Identity terms such as “I”, work in the same way, the successful
use of which are predicated on a history of discourse. “I” is
preceded by discourse—language has to have been designed in such a
manner that allows for talk of subjectivity. It is in this sense that
gender roles, such a femininity, are not a choice as Sartre conceives
them to be. Instead, a history of discourse comes to form the
subject. In the present day, “queer” has taken a more positive
tone of performativity, one less confined to shame. However, Butler
argues that one is mistaken in holding the idea that one identities
as “queer” in an “out of the blue” fashion. It is because
“queer” has existed as a mark of conventional contradiction that
one is able to take it up at all—even in aiming to change the
meaning of a term, one does so by reiterating the conventional use of
it.
Our examples have been instances of authority executing
performatives. How is it that those who are non-authoritative are
able to cite for the sake of binding force? This question can be held
to any and all instances in which the common person means to commit
successful performatives. Is this to say that the common citizen is
unable to self-identity if an authority figure is not present to bind
one to a gender personality? Butler does not offer much in answer to
these questions, and given “queer” seems to have been shamefully
bound to particular individuals over time that we now look to
challenge it today, it might assist us by having some sense of how
performative success occurs in non-authoritative social circles.
Nietzsche: the Creditor/Debtor Relationship
I
will focus primarily on the second essay of Genealogy
Of Morals,
in which Nietzsche discusses how it is we come to bind people to
shame and punishment. Nietzsche's account does not depend on whether
a person is authoritative or not, rather, his view offers the idea
that the more distant one is from authority in the social chain of
command, the more binding one's utterances become.
Nietzsche's theory refers to a certain type of relationship between
creditor and debtor in which the memory of one's debts to another is
what binds one to the performative utterances of others. In this
relationship, an individual, or a group, confers something to
another, and the latter fails to fulfill on what is conferred.
Nietzsche also dispenses with the subject, and thinks that each of us
is born into, and subjected to, a world that has started without us.
A conventional legacy is already in place in that the language of the
legacy immediately administers performatives onto a newborn: a
“doctor” in a “hospital” utters one's “sex”—each of the
elements in the equation successfully emerge through language in
being a reiteration of how, by whom, and where similar activity has
occurred in the past. As Butler points out, a doctor pronounces “It's
a girl!” and from that point forward one is committed to “girling”,
much like how a criminal is sentenced to jail by a judge, and how one
is committed to “queering” if one deviates from normative social
bond; the doctor's utterance is successfully performative. Due to the
vulnerability of youth, one grows up absorbing the language of what
constitutes “girling”, as well as “queering”, that latter
being an indication of punishment should one deviate from the former.
Any measure one takes against “girling” will be in the language
of “girling”, as discussed above, as will any talk of
subjectivity depend on the language of which being designed prior to
such deliberation.
Given
that the initial utterance by the doctor commits one to “girling”,
Nietzsche imposes that this aligns one with particular promises
pertaining to the conventional legacy—one has vowed to reiterate a
particular discourse within society. Doing this allows for one to
partake in all the advantages society can offer. In this manner
Nietzsche thinks that the self has made itself calculable: one looks
to the future by reiterating the past. Calculability is a human
measure for ensuring knowledge about our fellow humans, and this is
largely constitutive of creditor/debtor relations. Our memory of our
initial vow, serves as a promise to others that there will be no
surprises. In the case of a “no surprises” society, the
advantages alluded to before emerge—change has been conquered,
reason can flourish! Marriage ceremonies will continue to proceed as
they always have, ensuring the jubilation mentioned before for all
eternity. Those that impose calculability fulfill the creditor aspect
of the relationship, and it's the promise of gender normativity that
one owes
to all participants of a conventional legacy: one agrees to be
another link in the chain.
Nietzsche describes this relationship as being a “social
straightjacket”, a set of fixed ideas that is conferred to serve as
reminder of one's promises. Fixed ideas come in the shape of
“memories”, in particular, those that refer to instances of
punishment made upon those who broke their promises—pain serves as
the great memory inducer. Similar to how one is bound to “queering”
when disrupting the heterosexual social bond, one is entitled to
cruelty if one does not continuously reiterate normative mannerisms
pertaining to “girling”. The creditor/debtor marks the origin of
punishment as the creditor feels obligated to invoke injury on those
who fail to fulfill on their debts.
I hope it to be no mystery that each of us serves as a debtor in one
way or another, or in every possible way (slave morality), but who
exactly are these creditors? One simple answer may be that they are
authority figures, for it is their words that have binding power, as
convention has it. However, given the formality of the various trades
each of these authorities are involved in, it is not often that we
hear authorities pronouncing one to “queering”. The priest
pronounces a couple to be married, and indirectly establishes
homosexual taboos in that we react in a manner that predicates its
success. What of when we are not directly in the presence of
authorities? How is it we are adamantly inclined to performatives?
Nietzsche thinks our inclination to uphold our promises is empowered
by fixed ideas of punishment, and because our attachment to the
promise is strong, one thinks of oneself as deserving of shame and
cruelty if one opposes convention (a Nietzschian example would be a
Christian flogging of oneself). The authority may not be directly
present, but fixed memory allows one to privately echo performatives.
This is how we develop “bad conscience”, an illness that causes
one to turn against oneself—one becomes one's own menacing
authority figure. Nietzsche considers this an illness because,
returning to our example, one believes that it is still the doctor
who is binding one to the commitments of “girling”, while it is
really oneself, and it is successful! In this manner it is not only
authority figures who utter successful performatives, but also those
who are ill.
The
above instance shows how one serves as creditor turned against
oneself. Seeing as anyone can serve as a creditor, it should not be
thought it is done always in bad conscience, but anyone can invoke
the right of creditor upon others. For those of us with “good
memory”, adhering to this social straightjacket comes without
question, but Nietzsche thinks that instinct still draws one to
power. Those with good memory who are non-authoritative are reduced
to having to exhibit their instinct from within the confines of the
straightjacket. This means that one still plays along with the game
that performatives are what have binding force between people in
society. However, non-authoritative citizens do not match up with the
all the qualifications for a successful performatives, such as being
a certain person in a certain place, but only seem to meet up with
the appropriate thoughts and feelings accompanying the act and the
appropriate subsequent behavior (the latter covered by bad
conscience). Nietzsche feels this gives non-authoritative
performatives more power in that one has to put in extra effort to
“get the point across,” and rather than being able to invoke
convention, one commits another to “queering” by vicious insults
and physical force—one should be ashamed of not being calculable,
especially when the rest of us are doing our best to be so! The more
removed one is from authority, the more inclined one is to resort to
cruelty in order to instantiate binding power, and this type of
tactic has an unforgettable
affect,
a memory made salient by the terror inflicted to produce it. The
cruel performatives of non-authorities cause one to be far more
inclined to the promises made not to “queer”, or to continue
“girling”.
Conclusion
The
power of language to bind each other to particular values, and
manners of living, will play to the fate of each of us. While
authorities act by reiterating the law, riding the comfortable wave
of “justification”, common folk follow at their heels and aspire
to be in the “right of masters”, to partake in administrative
binding and to get a sense of what it's like to have people to look
down on. I made mention before of how in one way or another each of
us is a debtor, but which of us are creditors? A criticism can be
made against those who punish due to lack of hindsight about the true
nature of their promises, but this requires a particular kind of
discourse in which the criticism is turned against oneself: in what
ways do I bind people to my words?
1Judith
Butler, “Critically Queer,” GLQ: A Journal Of Lesbian and Gay
Studies
2J.L.
Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Harvard
University Press, 1975), 13-16
3Jean-Paul
Sartre, “Existentialism Is a Humanism”
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