Chapters 1-3 in the first division of Heidegger's, Being and Time,
pertain mostly to the existential examination of Dasein as
Being-in-the-world, the worldhood of the world, and the entities
contained therein. The manner in which those entities exist within the
world, and Dasein's relationship to those entities as an entity itself
was explained as such:
"That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world." (119)
In the midst of Being-in-the-world, Dasein encounters many entities, some of which are objects that qualify as equipment for a goal or end (ready-to-hand) that signify involvements, others are merely objects (present-at-hand). Dasein is different from either in that Dasein is an entity whose Being is an issue for itself, but Dasein isn't simply alone in a world of things, it is accompanied by entities who also have Being as an issue for itself. It was Sartre, in his story, No Exit, who said that “Hell is other people,” and seeing as the world is papered with people, each of whom is an instance of Dasein, it seems as though we can't involve ourselves in the world without being involved with Hell. Despite people being a troublesome sort, they're entities that we are most concerned with, due mostly to their capacity for well-being. For those who are morally affluent, the well-being of people is of great concern to the degree that such a sort can agree that a world with less unnecessary suffering is far better than a world with more unnecessary suffering. I aim to show that in being consumed by what Heidegger called the “they”, we are allowing the temptation to live routinely override our moral obligation towards others.
Being-Alone As a Deficient Mode Of Being-With
I'll begin with Heidegger's initial concern in chapter 4 of the first division of Being and Time, and that is with the “who” of everyday Dasein. Dasein's concern with the world, as Being-in-the-world, is with the circumspection of its environment. In the midst of those things that are equipment, with others that are simply there, Dasein is attempting to accomplish certain ends by means of the former. If I wish to hang a picture up on my wall there are certain things that I require that will serve as equipment for my particular end. As long as the affair is running smoothly, I don't even notice my using hammer, instead I look right past it towards my goal. If my hammer should break by some means, or if the nail should bend before being inserted into the wall, suddenly I'm looking right at them instead of past them. Their existence has become all too apparent to me and seeing as it's due to their failure to serve their purpose, which is really my purpose, their existence has become rather irritating. For the purposes of this demonstration I shall portray myself as the impatient type who is prone to anger, and with all the might I can muster I slam the hammer to the ground hoping that it has learned its lesson not to fail my ends.
Humorous as this example may be, it only remains so if my object of abuse is exactly that: a thing. It would be a mistake to think that Dasein is an entity all alone in a world of things. There are other entities in this world that to whom such a fit of anger, as with the hammer, would cause great harm, as it would be just as harmful to look past them. One way Dasein is made aware of this is through the ready-to-hand. In the instance of someone who works at a grocery store, there is much toil that goes into the store's presentation, much of which involves ordering things in a manner that will enable such things to better serve as equipment for oneself, and others. From the way in which the items for sale are displayed and the height of the shelves on which they are placed, to the organization of shopping carts for the sake of availability, to the very cash registers themselves is Dasein made wise to the fact that these items that serve as ready-to-hand for it also serve as ready-to-hand for others, some, if not all, the mentioned items serve the purpose of serving others. Dasein, whose world frees things as to be exposed as items of involvement, also does the same for those entities whose Being is distinct from the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. These entities have the Being that is like that of Dasein, and as such, Being is an issue for them. Simply put, we are speaking of other instances of Dasein apart from the ontic “I”.
To be clear on what is meant by “I”, it shouldn't immediately be thought of as a given to the answer to the question of the “who”: “This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it.” (150) As “I” is constitutive in this manner, it ontically sets apart the Dasein that is in each case I myself from Others. In this way “I” functions as a formal indicator. Heidegger didn't see it as phenomenally adequate to take the “I” as a given in regards to the problem of the “who”, seeing as when it comes to Being-in-the-world, “a bare subject without a world never “is” proximally, nor is it even given.” (152) It was mentioned before that Dasein's world “frees” things, that is, it has the kind of Being that allows for things to be encountered as ready-to-hand. It is in this manner that Dasein discloses itself to itself, but this wouldn't be the case if Dasein didn't have this kind of Being. The ontic “I” as given does not help to indicate the “who” of Dasein seeing as simply stating “I am this entity” does not necessarily disclose Dasein in its everydayness. In this respect, Heidegger thought that one could make the claim “I am this entity” and have it be a false claim. Seeing as it was mentioned that Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself, this may appear to be a contradiction, but “I” is false in this sense only as a formal indicator:
"Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says “I am this entity”, and in the long run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity." (151)
Heidegger states something similar later when discussing the authentic 'I':
"The they-self keeps on saying “I” most loudly and most frequently because at bottom it is not authentically itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-Being." (369)
Seeing as “I” can be false as such, i.e., reveal itself as its opposite in some phenomenal context of Being, it's best not to take it as a given for the problem of the “who”. It is by this understanding that “not-I” is not an instance of an entity that lacks “I-hood”, but rather the kind of Being which Dasein possess in this sense is one of having-lost-itself. This sense of “I” is important to keep in mind as it will be crucial to my case, given that this sense of “I” is the most commonly appealed to amongst the they as an appeal to the “who”.
It may seem that refusing to take the “I” as given as an adequate starting point for the investigation of the “who” of everyday Dasein leaves us with nothing and nowhere to go. This line of thought in-itself is a misunderstanding of the they-self attempting to interpret the Being of Dasein from within the confines of everydayness. Before we can see the nature of this problem of interpreting, it first must be made clear the “who” of everyday Dasein from an existential perspective, one that involves taking into account a phenomenal context in regards to “what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experience and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.” (150) Returning to the consideration of Dasein's Being-in as revealing a totality of involvements within-the-world, having goals that consist of utilizing things that are endowed with purpose by my Being-in and being concerned, we see that things aren't the only entities to be revealed by Being-in, but other Daseins are encountered within the context of the ready-to-hand (this cash register is to serve me serve others). The cash register seen in isolation would make as little sense as would seeing Dasein in isolation. Given this type of co-determination, Heidegger felt the best place of departure ought to be from Being-in-the-world. It was an entity whose Being is like that of Dasein that is revealed to Dasein as Being-in, and this other entity is 'in' the world at the same time as those things that Being-in discloses as within-the-world; this entity is 'in' by way of Being-in-the-world. This other entity, can be understood as the Other. By “Other”, Heidegger doesn't mean to consider such an entity as one who is “apart from me”, from whom the “I” stands out. On the contrary, we are to understand the Other as from whom one doesn't distinguish oneself, as those to whom the Self is to considered as being on common ground with; those among whom one is too. Being-in-the-world is a state which one shares with Others as with-world, as such, Dasein as Being-in is Being-with Others. The Other, then, is “in your shoes” as also Being-in, and can be addressed as the Dasein-with of Others.
As we begin to approach our understanding of Hell (which should be understood simply as an address of a tumultuous situation and not of some terrestrial sinister presence), the misunderstanding that one can have in considering any portion of Dasein's existence as Being-alone ought to be addressed. Much like the Dasein that is in each case I myself, Dasein is not to be grasped as something present-at-hand seeing as Being is something that 'I' take issue with. Given that the Other is among whom one is too, the Dasein-with of Others is an entity whose Being is an issue for itself. When looking back at the hammer, a thing whose Being is not that of Dasein or Dasein-with, my anger with the instrument holds no consequence to the instrument itself. One may protest, just to annoy me, and say that if I were to break the hammer then its state may change to simply present-at-hand, and thus I have brought about a consequence for the hammer. We should see, however, that this consequence is in light of the Other's protest, that the item that was once ready-to-hand, and now is no longer, provides a consequence to someone else who may have wanted to use it. Its Being is an issue for Dasein, not itself. Within that context it should be easy to see that my actions, which don't have consequence for things in the world, will have consequence for the Other. Those who may read this might think “of course” as though such a notion is obvious to all, but there are those to whom such an idea is not obvious, and there are even those to whom it is obvious to, but they believe this knowledge serves as good reason to forget it. These two discourses will be examined further when we get to Singer's “Pond Dilemma”, and some mentioning of Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger and “juggling roles”. In the mean time its important to note that any conception of Dasein as Being-alone is not a justified state that Dasein can have other than it being simply a deficient mode of Being-with:
Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. (156-157)
As Dasein is understood as Being-in, and Being-in is Being-with, one can't be alone without Being-in-the-world, and thus Being-alone is Being-with; Dasein-with is existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world. One may refer to examples of a “lonely night” in which one is either wandering dark empty streets, or is alone in one's room left only to one's thoughts. Are not these examples of Being-alone? No.
In an instance of a lonely night, one may feel as though there is no world apart from their melancholy, but this is not so. In either case, it seems as though one wants to imagine that in being alone with my thoughts is Being-alone. But the mind never seems to turn off as it regards its dealings with the environment, to the extent that most of the time it doesn't even realize its turned on. Being-in-the-world puts Dasein in a position of revealing to itself a totality of involvements with the things around it. As the ready-to-hand is present insofar as Dasein is Being-in, then things are there with us, as the mode of Dasein-with also reveals the Dasein of Others to itself. Being-with is in every case a characteristic of Dasein, and when considered as such, my involvement in the world is dependent on Others, and reflectively as much as my Being is determinative of the Other. This co-dependence is critical when we consider that one is as one does, and what one does will not be in isolation. This co-dependence I also problematic to the enigma of “who” see as so long as one understands oneself in terms of the with-world, one is in subjection to the Other and is not itself.
The They-Self
As the Other is an entity among whom one is too, and one is as one does, the same can be said of the Others: they are as they do. We are correct in understanding the Other as an entity whom one does not distinguish from oneself, but our everyday Being-with-one-another is in a position of subjection, and this is understood existentially as distantiality. In Being-in-the-world, our circumspection with the ready-to-hand must be interpreted in terms of care, the existential formula for which is “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)”. The details of this structure are complex and require a great amount of detail beyond the parameters of the they-self, but we have received some hints at this structure from the state of Being-in. For this study, all one need know is that Being-in-the-world is essentially care, and the Being of Dasein is to generally be defined as care. As Dasein-with, there is constant care toward the way in which one differs from the Others, and this concern can either be due to lagging behind and desiring to catch up with Others, or being ahead of them and being able to keep them suppressed, both relations to Others is said to be distantiality. Concern over distantiality places Dasein as everyday Being-with in subjection to Others. When the “I” was being sorted out before, and it was pointed out how one could claim “I” while Dasein is not itself, we have arrived at that case.
Subjection to Others has taken Being away from Dasein and Dasein is none the wiser. Being-with as such doesn't get us any closer to the “who”, but instead has placed Dasein within the grasp of the “they”.
"The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the “they”." (164)
Returning to the grocery store, in utilizing the carts, registers, walking in designated aisles, following signs, exchanging cash, and other such mannerism that are involved with shopping, one's own Dasein is being dissolved into the Other. My ability to discern the Dasein that is in each case I myself vanishes as one is subjected to Others. As distantiality brings about subjection, distantiality is grounded with one's concern with averageness, an existential characteristic of the they. In desiring to either catching up with, or mastering, the Other, Dasein is giving up its claim to Self, it is seeing itself in light of the they, as prescribed by the they (we do as they do).
In the article, Heidegger On Being a Person, Haugeland addresses the conformity that seems to take place in regards to the they. As Heidegger doesn't make it exactly clear in which instance is conformity positive, and when it's negative, conformity in the former sense is as such because it is by this partaking in the everydayness of worldhood that Dasein as Being-with comes to an understanding. This understanding is exhibited by Dasein's involvement as “normal” as it concerns the they; Dasein is using things and composing itself correctly. It's in the same context that conformity is also negative as the they has stripped Dasein of its Being and obscured its potentiality-for-Being from being disclosed to itself. The positive aspect of conformity is what Haugeland described as “[a] tendency to see that one's neighbors do likewise, and to suppress variation.” Again, this is meant to indicate that Dasein acquires intelligibility by means of a totality of involvements, the ready-to-hand that indicate the Other. Apart from this we will concern ourselves primarily with the negative aspects.
Towards the beginning of Haugeland's article, he describes the conformity implied in Being and Time as “systematic peer pressure”. Haugeland's analysis of the they starts by likening the kind of Being of everydayness that the they prescribes to that of a herd of cattle. He too distinguishes our study from an ontical environmental position of entities as he claims that it is not the herd itself that comes together when beckoned, rather, it's behavioral norms. Haugeland interprets the cluster of the herd as such because the herd's behavior is generated and maintained by censoriousness. Looking back at Heidegger, we can see censoriousness as “leveling-down”. In averageness, the they determines what can and can't be done, what is acceptable and what isn't, and any nail that sticks out above the rest is hammered down. Seeing as care is what compels Dasein toward averageness, an essential tendency of Dasein is revealed as leveling-down. Similar to the “hammering down” analogy, leveling-down hammers in all possibilities of Being for Dasein so as to make them level, and as such, unnoticeable. Haugeland understood this as keeping “out-of-step behavior” in check, to consider anything atypical and abnormal as what one is “not supposed to do”. It is by Dasein's leveling-down that averageness is maintained, and the desires and goals of the they become the desires and goals of the one.
The three ways of Being for the they thus far are distantiality, averageness, and leveling-down. Each constitute what Heidegger calls “publicness”. It is by publicness that the they has dominance over Dasein. Norms are no longer something that one sees, but rather, much like the hammer when fulfilling its purpose, they're transparent and in effect. Dasein is not itself while consumed by publicness, instead it is dancing to the beat of another drummer, and it is doing so while being none the wiser to it. As mentioned before, Dasein's everyday participation in the they obscures the notion that Dasein is in each case I myself.
"Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The “they”, which supplies the answer to the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody” to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other." (166)
As it is care that inclines us to distantiality that in turn puts us in subjection, Dasein is comfortable in the grip of the they. One may think of not-Being-oneself as easier and simpler than Being-oneself, and, as it was mentioned before, the “I” that one says the most loudly is misunderstood as the “who”, but while in the grip of the they, our misunderstanding is one we have in ignorance. After all, any instance that may seem out of sorts for publicness is leveled-down, and a recognition of the error of “I” would be such an instance. This is definitely a case in which ignorance can be said to be bliss, given that, as Heidegger continues forward in his text, one's discovering the Self is a complex and a difficult task, and it seems to be far easier to be wrong and just shout “I”.
The comfort that the they seems to provide is progressed further by disburdenment and accommodation. When Dasein is disburdened, it is relieved of agency, as “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself...”. In surrendering to the they, Dasein has been relieved of accountability seeing as it can invoke the they to be answerable for its activities. It's in this sense of being invoked that the they accommodates Dasein by disburdening it from accountability. This accommodation is a comfortable position for one to be in as one is enabled to always “pass the buck”, and, seemingly, be justified in concluding that one's actions aren't one's own. It is by these measures, including leveling-down, that Sartre was inspired to bring forth his notion of “Bad Faith”, in which he criticized such behavior as being self-deceptive. Sartre's stance was one of absolute free will: “Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.” (Being and Nothingness) Sartre's own investigation into the meaning of Being saw instances of Bad Faith as a problem, given that free will is an absolute, one commits oneself to accommodation and disburdenment freely, i.e., one chooses not to choose. Although Sartre's total account of Being doesn't exactly line up with Heidegger's, both envision that Dasein (or in the case of Sartre, the “For-itself”) has the capacity to phenomenally escape the clutches of the they, and to authentically take account of oneself.
How Dasein Steps In: Solicitude
The interpretation of the “they-self” as a way of Being-with that Heidegger presents gets back to his question of the “who” only in regards to the everydayness of Being-with-one-another. It is in the everyday sense that the question is answered. The scope of this essay is to keep to the analysis of the they-self, but as mentioned above, Heidegger believed that one can escape the they and take hold of oneself, to authentically Be-one's-Self, a mode of Being that he thought to be an existentell modification of the they. Haugeland considers such a state to be like that of “juggling competing properties”, and that when Dasein succeeds in doing so, it is in the mode of confronting conflicts and resolving them. Haugeland saw this mode as being a higher-level disposition of self-criticism, a mode considered to be on the complete opposite side of the spectrum from disburdenment and accommodation. On the side of the latter we simply “slide,” to take the path of least resistance, and concern ourselves with only those most immediate of issues. We forget, or level-down, those that are not immediate, out of one's ontic proximity, and temporarily out of sight. While on the side of self-criticism we don't let some dispositions override others, instead we resolutely alter or eliminate dispositions. It is in this sense that Haugeland interpreted authenticity as self-ownedness, i.e., getting one's act together.
While Haugelands interpretation of Heidegger gives a nice glimpse into the implications of Authenticity, the particulars of which require far more detail than what can be allowed here. However, there is a state of Dasein's Being that is bound up with its authentic Being towards itself, and that is solicitude. We are to understand “solicitude” as corresponding to “concern”, for they are both interpreted in terms of care, the difference being that concern is a character-of-Being that Being-with can't have as it own. What concern has in its sights are objects, and thus is involved with things ready-to-hand, while solicitude is a character-of-Being through which Dasein as Being-with comports itself as towards those entities whose Being is like that of Dasein. In other words, solicitude is a state of Dasein's Being whose issue is with the Being of Others.
Heidegger introduces us to solicitude by its modes of deficiency. Such states include Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, and not “mattering” to one another. Each of these different ways of solicitude, which are understood as deficient and indifferent modes, characterizes everyday Being-with-one-another. In this sense, the Dasein-with of Others is barely, if at all, distinguishable from the ready-to-hand. If we are to take the Dasein-with of Others as something ready-to-hand, as a piece of equipment, then my angry-at-hammer scenario would hold as little consequence to the hammer as it would to a person whom I may decide to pick up and throw against the ground because he didn't assist fulfilling my ends. Is this not the same dilemma that we face in the work place, when bosses and managers, who are concerned solely with profits, look past those “things” that are serving their ends so long as they are functioning? What is the usual response that such management has to those “things” that interrupt their goal? They're fired of course, and it is not the ready-to-hand that a boss fires, but a Dasein-with of Others that has been mistaken for something ready-to-hand.
Deficiency implies the adequate, and as it concerns the adequate mode of solicitude, there are two possibilities. The first of which can be said to be a leaping in, in which Dasein jumps in for the Other and takes over that which he or she may be concerned with. This may have the appearance of help, but it is in fact a way in which the Other whom one leaps in for is dominated. Care is taken away in this form of solicitude, and the Other can either step back and watch as you take care of something for him, or the Other can simply disburden himself from the task at hand. Since the Other is in a state of concern regarding the ready-to-hand, and is also in the position of disburdening a thing or event from itself, the Other in this sense is most likely in the thralls of the they, and thus is in a very vulnerable position to be leapt in for.
The other mode of solicitude is to leap ahead of the Other in its existentiell potentiality-for-Being. In this mode Dasein is not taking care away from the Other, rather, it is to give it back to the Other so as to make him aware of his potentiality-for-Being. To distinguish this from leaping-in, leaping-ahead can be seen as a master and student type of relationship. The master isn't so much molding the student to be a particular way that might not be of the student's choosing, instead the master, who is wise to many ways of life, is helping the student's disposition to be open to various possibilities, each of which the student in turn will choose for himself. This sort of solicitude pertains to authentic care, and it assists the Other in a way that allows him “to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.” (159)
“The Pond Dilemma” and the Belief Of Well-Being
Given what has been presented in regards to the they-self, and authentic solicitude, I will briefly present two ethical views, one of which originally presented by Peter Singer, the other by Mylan Engel, Jr. Both should exhibit how being consumed by the they, and appealing back to the they endangers our ethical standards and beliefs.
In his article,”Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer describes a situation in which he is going about his business, headed to lecture to be exact, when he notices a small child has fallen into a pond and is in danger of drowning. Would anyone deny that he ought to wade in and pull the child out? Apart from saving the child, the consequences of his rescue are simply that his routine is disrupted. As it may be imagined, any instance in which the they is disrupted from everydayness, usually by something uncanny or abnormal, in this case a drowning child in a pond, the Dasein-with whose Being is care comports itself toward averageness, and in order to acquire or maintain average everydayness, Dasein-with has the essential tendency to level-down. This implies that the pond dilemma, as disruption to his lecture, will be evened out among a variety of norms so that the possibility of attempting rescue gets obscured in the mix of activities that the they prescribes in order to better retain its dominion. Dasein, whose being has been taken away by the they, does not have it potentiality-for-Being disclosed to itself, but rather it it is prone to disburdenment. The they, which constantly accommodates, will hold Dasein in a position in which it will rescue the kid only in the instance that rescuing is advocated as a norm by the they. If the latter be the case, then it may seem as though the they-self may still be able to achieve some ethical ends, but it does so in the absence of authentic solicitude. As it said before, the they answers the “who” of everyday Being-with-one-another, not of authentic Being-one's-Self.
One may wonder what the problem is, so long as the kid was saved what does it matter if it was the they-self that instigated it, or authentic Dasein? With the former, as Dasein has surrendered to the they, it is disburdened from accountability and can always invoke the they to be accountable for one's agency. In this particular instance we can imagine that it is a social norm to save a child from drowning in a pond as decided by the they, but what if the they had prescribed things differently? The problem here is that nothing changes in Dasein's compliance; conformity as compliance is accommodating for Dasein. We can't get upset at the bloke who didn't rescue the child, and due to the accommodating they, we can't get upset at anyone for the incident seeing as the “who” of everyday Being-with-one-another is answered as “nobody”; Dasein as “nobody” is not accountable for its actions. Of course we can say ontically that there was someone present to the child as he was drowning, but if the entirety of the this scenario is understood within the grip of the they, not only is it that “nobody” doesn't rescue the kid, but there is also “nobody” to criticize the indifference. When I suppose that “we can't get upset,” the “we” that I'm presuming is from an authentic state of solicitude, in which we understand the well-being of the Other as a potentiality-for-Being. This solicitude is vacant in the they, seeing as potentiality-for-Being is an authentic state-of-Being for Dasein, a state in which it understands itself in light of its possibilities. In the instance of leveling-down we're left to ask what possibilities?
As it is the they that decides the fate of the drowning child, we can only hope that the they have prescribed matters to be in the child's favor. The problem of the pond dilemma as taken to be an incident contained within the confines of the they is that one can only do as they do. I should hope that the scope of this problem will be taken into account as such that we can imagine many like scenarios in which the well-being of the Dasein that is in each case I myself, or the Dasein of another, may be threaten, and its well-being is taken into account only if the they prescribes it as acceptable to do so. If the they should prescribe indifference towards the child, then our dismay can only come from being extracted from the they, a state that is achievable as prescribed by Heidegger, Sartre, and Haugeland. Th latter offers self-criticism as a glimpse of Heidegger's notions of Authenticity, and by Sartre's doctrine of Bad Faith we are given a proposition that places Dasein in a condemned state of accountability.
As the pond problem was interpreted in regards to everyday Being-with-one-another, the point of departure for Engel's proposition is one that is extracted from the they, but the problem here is the appeal back to everydayness. In his article, “Hunger, Duty, and Ecology,” Engel refers back to Singer's pond example, but more for the use of drawing out a belief that those who are morally affluent are likely to oblige. The belief is simply that a world with less unnecessary suffering is better than a world with more unnecessary suffering. He interprets most moral arguments as being troublesome for people because they usually impose onto them things that they don't want to do, an example of this is animal rights arguments. Arguments advocating that animal welfare ought to be considered troubles most seeing as it imposing that one do something that one may not want to do, e.g., not eat meat. Engel's position is different, however, in that he does not seek to impose any of his beliefs onto you, instead he seeks to show that it is your very own beliefs that commits you to certain moral obligations. His argument strings together a collection of beliefs that one may have regarding the well-being of others, and if one agrees to believing in the collective whole, then one is committed to the “moral obligatoriness” of one's own beliefs.
The string of beliefs is long and I will not recite them all here, but one of which was stated earlier regarding our tendency to advocate less unnecessary suffering over more unnecessary suffering. He notes that one is obliged toward this belief in a manner that is of no great detriment to oneself. Being as such, if one is poor, and barely has the funds to feed oneself, then it would be irrational to believe that he ought to donate towards famine relief (Engel's aim). As it pertains to those of us that are actually able to donate a small portion of our salary at no great cost to one's own well-being, then there is really nothing obstructing one from committing to one's own belief. However, it's quite possible that the knowledge of Others suffering elsewhere may come as a major inconvenience as it concerns one's daily routine. I'm sure nobody wants their latte purchase to be interrupted with the consideration that one could abandon their purchase and instead donate the $4 to a famine relief organization. As we are conceiving of Dasein's Being-with in this instance as initially one of authentic solicitude, the problem occurs when knowledge of those suffering elsewhere comes as an inconvenience, and seeing as it is one's very own beliefs on the matter that is making one's potentiality-for-Being apparent to oneself, Dasein may find the they's constant accommodating as all too tempting. Dasein in this instance may feel overwhelmed with its very own potentiality, and as such, may resort to an appeal to publicness. Much like the pond, Dasein may become alleviated from its own beliefs if it chooses to duck for cover within the they-self where it will be met with the graces of disburdenment and accommodation. As Dasein has made it imperative to appeal to the they in this instance, it does so not only to obscure its potentiality-for-Being from itself, but also as to run from its ability to consider the well-being of Others, to run from authentic solicitude. As such, the truth of the belief regarding the well-being of Others is not in question, but rather confirmed, and this gives Dasein all the more reason to run as it is not willing to incur interruption onto its everydayness.
Self-Criticism As a Way To Account For Well-Being
Going back to Haugeland's self-criticism, he thought that when Dasein is in the position of “juggling competing properties,” it has the option to either slide into the path of least resistance (everyday Being-with-one-another), or to confront conflicts and resolve them (authentic potentiality-for-Being). As we did not go into the details of authenticity as Heidegger understood it, we viewed Haugeland's brief interpretation of authenticity under the state-of-Being that is Self-criticism. Looking at Engel's proposition of “moral obligatoriness”, we have a scenario in which Dasein, who observed the belief with dismay by means of authentic solicitude, may feel tempted to fall back into the they seeing as solicitude in this way is the most difficult to sustain. This is greatly due to such solicitude is carried out apart from the they, and as such, one is completely accountable for one's involvements, no appeal can be made to the they as to whether an interruption to the routine should be addressed or not. If one should choose not to address it, Dasein as authentic Being-one's-Self is answerable to what has been nullified in its potentiality-for-Being, and Dasein is Guitly! of said nullity.
In the juggling alluded to by Haugeland, Dasein has two roles to consider, two potential ways of Being. The first of which is to be the one who “enjoys one's lattes on a daily basis”, the other to be one who “gives up at least one latte to donate to famine relief”. We do not have to consider either role as better than the other, but what Haugeland suggests with juggling is a higher-level disposition of self-criticism that entails the Dasein does not simply let some ways of Being override others, but instead to resolutely alter its ways of Being or eliminate them. Either way, Dasein in this regard is self-owned, and as such, frees itself to better consider the well-being of Others.
"That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world." (119)
In the midst of Being-in-the-world, Dasein encounters many entities, some of which are objects that qualify as equipment for a goal or end (ready-to-hand) that signify involvements, others are merely objects (present-at-hand). Dasein is different from either in that Dasein is an entity whose Being is an issue for itself, but Dasein isn't simply alone in a world of things, it is accompanied by entities who also have Being as an issue for itself. It was Sartre, in his story, No Exit, who said that “Hell is other people,” and seeing as the world is papered with people, each of whom is an instance of Dasein, it seems as though we can't involve ourselves in the world without being involved with Hell. Despite people being a troublesome sort, they're entities that we are most concerned with, due mostly to their capacity for well-being. For those who are morally affluent, the well-being of people is of great concern to the degree that such a sort can agree that a world with less unnecessary suffering is far better than a world with more unnecessary suffering. I aim to show that in being consumed by what Heidegger called the “they”, we are allowing the temptation to live routinely override our moral obligation towards others.
Being-Alone As a Deficient Mode Of Being-With
I'll begin with Heidegger's initial concern in chapter 4 of the first division of Being and Time, and that is with the “who” of everyday Dasein. Dasein's concern with the world, as Being-in-the-world, is with the circumspection of its environment. In the midst of those things that are equipment, with others that are simply there, Dasein is attempting to accomplish certain ends by means of the former. If I wish to hang a picture up on my wall there are certain things that I require that will serve as equipment for my particular end. As long as the affair is running smoothly, I don't even notice my using hammer, instead I look right past it towards my goal. If my hammer should break by some means, or if the nail should bend before being inserted into the wall, suddenly I'm looking right at them instead of past them. Their existence has become all too apparent to me and seeing as it's due to their failure to serve their purpose, which is really my purpose, their existence has become rather irritating. For the purposes of this demonstration I shall portray myself as the impatient type who is prone to anger, and with all the might I can muster I slam the hammer to the ground hoping that it has learned its lesson not to fail my ends.
Humorous as this example may be, it only remains so if my object of abuse is exactly that: a thing. It would be a mistake to think that Dasein is an entity all alone in a world of things. There are other entities in this world that to whom such a fit of anger, as with the hammer, would cause great harm, as it would be just as harmful to look past them. One way Dasein is made aware of this is through the ready-to-hand. In the instance of someone who works at a grocery store, there is much toil that goes into the store's presentation, much of which involves ordering things in a manner that will enable such things to better serve as equipment for oneself, and others. From the way in which the items for sale are displayed and the height of the shelves on which they are placed, to the organization of shopping carts for the sake of availability, to the very cash registers themselves is Dasein made wise to the fact that these items that serve as ready-to-hand for it also serve as ready-to-hand for others, some, if not all, the mentioned items serve the purpose of serving others. Dasein, whose world frees things as to be exposed as items of involvement, also does the same for those entities whose Being is distinct from the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. These entities have the Being that is like that of Dasein, and as such, Being is an issue for them. Simply put, we are speaking of other instances of Dasein apart from the ontic “I”.
To be clear on what is meant by “I”, it shouldn't immediately be thought of as a given to the answer to the question of the “who”: “This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it.” (150) As “I” is constitutive in this manner, it ontically sets apart the Dasein that is in each case I myself from Others. In this way “I” functions as a formal indicator. Heidegger didn't see it as phenomenally adequate to take the “I” as a given in regards to the problem of the “who”, seeing as when it comes to Being-in-the-world, “a bare subject without a world never “is” proximally, nor is it even given.” (152) It was mentioned before that Dasein's world “frees” things, that is, it has the kind of Being that allows for things to be encountered as ready-to-hand. It is in this manner that Dasein discloses itself to itself, but this wouldn't be the case if Dasein didn't have this kind of Being. The ontic “I” as given does not help to indicate the “who” of Dasein seeing as simply stating “I am this entity” does not necessarily disclose Dasein in its everydayness. In this respect, Heidegger thought that one could make the claim “I am this entity” and have it be a false claim. Seeing as it was mentioned that Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself, this may appear to be a contradiction, but “I” is false in this sense only as a formal indicator:
"Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says “I am this entity”, and in the long run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity." (151)
Heidegger states something similar later when discussing the authentic 'I':
"The they-self keeps on saying “I” most loudly and most frequently because at bottom it is not authentically itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-Being." (369)
Seeing as “I” can be false as such, i.e., reveal itself as its opposite in some phenomenal context of Being, it's best not to take it as a given for the problem of the “who”. It is by this understanding that “not-I” is not an instance of an entity that lacks “I-hood”, but rather the kind of Being which Dasein possess in this sense is one of having-lost-itself. This sense of “I” is important to keep in mind as it will be crucial to my case, given that this sense of “I” is the most commonly appealed to amongst the they as an appeal to the “who”.
It may seem that refusing to take the “I” as given as an adequate starting point for the investigation of the “who” of everyday Dasein leaves us with nothing and nowhere to go. This line of thought in-itself is a misunderstanding of the they-self attempting to interpret the Being of Dasein from within the confines of everydayness. Before we can see the nature of this problem of interpreting, it first must be made clear the “who” of everyday Dasein from an existential perspective, one that involves taking into account a phenomenal context in regards to “what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experience and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.” (150) Returning to the consideration of Dasein's Being-in as revealing a totality of involvements within-the-world, having goals that consist of utilizing things that are endowed with purpose by my Being-in and being concerned, we see that things aren't the only entities to be revealed by Being-in, but other Daseins are encountered within the context of the ready-to-hand (this cash register is to serve me serve others). The cash register seen in isolation would make as little sense as would seeing Dasein in isolation. Given this type of co-determination, Heidegger felt the best place of departure ought to be from Being-in-the-world. It was an entity whose Being is like that of Dasein that is revealed to Dasein as Being-in, and this other entity is 'in' the world at the same time as those things that Being-in discloses as within-the-world; this entity is 'in' by way of Being-in-the-world. This other entity, can be understood as the Other. By “Other”, Heidegger doesn't mean to consider such an entity as one who is “apart from me”, from whom the “I” stands out. On the contrary, we are to understand the Other as from whom one doesn't distinguish oneself, as those to whom the Self is to considered as being on common ground with; those among whom one is too. Being-in-the-world is a state which one shares with Others as with-world, as such, Dasein as Being-in is Being-with Others. The Other, then, is “in your shoes” as also Being-in, and can be addressed as the Dasein-with of Others.
As we begin to approach our understanding of Hell (which should be understood simply as an address of a tumultuous situation and not of some terrestrial sinister presence), the misunderstanding that one can have in considering any portion of Dasein's existence as Being-alone ought to be addressed. Much like the Dasein that is in each case I myself, Dasein is not to be grasped as something present-at-hand seeing as Being is something that 'I' take issue with. Given that the Other is among whom one is too, the Dasein-with of Others is an entity whose Being is an issue for itself. When looking back at the hammer, a thing whose Being is not that of Dasein or Dasein-with, my anger with the instrument holds no consequence to the instrument itself. One may protest, just to annoy me, and say that if I were to break the hammer then its state may change to simply present-at-hand, and thus I have brought about a consequence for the hammer. We should see, however, that this consequence is in light of the Other's protest, that the item that was once ready-to-hand, and now is no longer, provides a consequence to someone else who may have wanted to use it. Its Being is an issue for Dasein, not itself. Within that context it should be easy to see that my actions, which don't have consequence for things in the world, will have consequence for the Other. Those who may read this might think “of course” as though such a notion is obvious to all, but there are those to whom such an idea is not obvious, and there are even those to whom it is obvious to, but they believe this knowledge serves as good reason to forget it. These two discourses will be examined further when we get to Singer's “Pond Dilemma”, and some mentioning of Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger and “juggling roles”. In the mean time its important to note that any conception of Dasein as Being-alone is not a justified state that Dasein can have other than it being simply a deficient mode of Being-with:
Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. (156-157)
As Dasein is understood as Being-in, and Being-in is Being-with, one can't be alone without Being-in-the-world, and thus Being-alone is Being-with; Dasein-with is existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world. One may refer to examples of a “lonely night” in which one is either wandering dark empty streets, or is alone in one's room left only to one's thoughts. Are not these examples of Being-alone? No.
In an instance of a lonely night, one may feel as though there is no world apart from their melancholy, but this is not so. In either case, it seems as though one wants to imagine that in being alone with my thoughts is Being-alone. But the mind never seems to turn off as it regards its dealings with the environment, to the extent that most of the time it doesn't even realize its turned on. Being-in-the-world puts Dasein in a position of revealing to itself a totality of involvements with the things around it. As the ready-to-hand is present insofar as Dasein is Being-in, then things are there with us, as the mode of Dasein-with also reveals the Dasein of Others to itself. Being-with is in every case a characteristic of Dasein, and when considered as such, my involvement in the world is dependent on Others, and reflectively as much as my Being is determinative of the Other. This co-dependence is critical when we consider that one is as one does, and what one does will not be in isolation. This co-dependence I also problematic to the enigma of “who” see as so long as one understands oneself in terms of the with-world, one is in subjection to the Other and is not itself.
The They-Self
As the Other is an entity among whom one is too, and one is as one does, the same can be said of the Others: they are as they do. We are correct in understanding the Other as an entity whom one does not distinguish from oneself, but our everyday Being-with-one-another is in a position of subjection, and this is understood existentially as distantiality. In Being-in-the-world, our circumspection with the ready-to-hand must be interpreted in terms of care, the existential formula for which is “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)”. The details of this structure are complex and require a great amount of detail beyond the parameters of the they-self, but we have received some hints at this structure from the state of Being-in. For this study, all one need know is that Being-in-the-world is essentially care, and the Being of Dasein is to generally be defined as care. As Dasein-with, there is constant care toward the way in which one differs from the Others, and this concern can either be due to lagging behind and desiring to catch up with Others, or being ahead of them and being able to keep them suppressed, both relations to Others is said to be distantiality. Concern over distantiality places Dasein as everyday Being-with in subjection to Others. When the “I” was being sorted out before, and it was pointed out how one could claim “I” while Dasein is not itself, we have arrived at that case.
Subjection to Others has taken Being away from Dasein and Dasein is none the wiser. Being-with as such doesn't get us any closer to the “who”, but instead has placed Dasein within the grasp of the “they”.
"The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the “they”." (164)
Returning to the grocery store, in utilizing the carts, registers, walking in designated aisles, following signs, exchanging cash, and other such mannerism that are involved with shopping, one's own Dasein is being dissolved into the Other. My ability to discern the Dasein that is in each case I myself vanishes as one is subjected to Others. As distantiality brings about subjection, distantiality is grounded with one's concern with averageness, an existential characteristic of the they. In desiring to either catching up with, or mastering, the Other, Dasein is giving up its claim to Self, it is seeing itself in light of the they, as prescribed by the they (we do as they do).
In the article, Heidegger On Being a Person, Haugeland addresses the conformity that seems to take place in regards to the they. As Heidegger doesn't make it exactly clear in which instance is conformity positive, and when it's negative, conformity in the former sense is as such because it is by this partaking in the everydayness of worldhood that Dasein as Being-with comes to an understanding. This understanding is exhibited by Dasein's involvement as “normal” as it concerns the they; Dasein is using things and composing itself correctly. It's in the same context that conformity is also negative as the they has stripped Dasein of its Being and obscured its potentiality-for-Being from being disclosed to itself. The positive aspect of conformity is what Haugeland described as “[a] tendency to see that one's neighbors do likewise, and to suppress variation.” Again, this is meant to indicate that Dasein acquires intelligibility by means of a totality of involvements, the ready-to-hand that indicate the Other. Apart from this we will concern ourselves primarily with the negative aspects.
Towards the beginning of Haugeland's article, he describes the conformity implied in Being and Time as “systematic peer pressure”. Haugeland's analysis of the they starts by likening the kind of Being of everydayness that the they prescribes to that of a herd of cattle. He too distinguishes our study from an ontical environmental position of entities as he claims that it is not the herd itself that comes together when beckoned, rather, it's behavioral norms. Haugeland interprets the cluster of the herd as such because the herd's behavior is generated and maintained by censoriousness. Looking back at Heidegger, we can see censoriousness as “leveling-down”. In averageness, the they determines what can and can't be done, what is acceptable and what isn't, and any nail that sticks out above the rest is hammered down. Seeing as care is what compels Dasein toward averageness, an essential tendency of Dasein is revealed as leveling-down. Similar to the “hammering down” analogy, leveling-down hammers in all possibilities of Being for Dasein so as to make them level, and as such, unnoticeable. Haugeland understood this as keeping “out-of-step behavior” in check, to consider anything atypical and abnormal as what one is “not supposed to do”. It is by Dasein's leveling-down that averageness is maintained, and the desires and goals of the they become the desires and goals of the one.
The three ways of Being for the they thus far are distantiality, averageness, and leveling-down. Each constitute what Heidegger calls “publicness”. It is by publicness that the they has dominance over Dasein. Norms are no longer something that one sees, but rather, much like the hammer when fulfilling its purpose, they're transparent and in effect. Dasein is not itself while consumed by publicness, instead it is dancing to the beat of another drummer, and it is doing so while being none the wiser to it. As mentioned before, Dasein's everyday participation in the they obscures the notion that Dasein is in each case I myself.
"Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The “they”, which supplies the answer to the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody” to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other." (166)
As it is care that inclines us to distantiality that in turn puts us in subjection, Dasein is comfortable in the grip of the they. One may think of not-Being-oneself as easier and simpler than Being-oneself, and, as it was mentioned before, the “I” that one says the most loudly is misunderstood as the “who”, but while in the grip of the they, our misunderstanding is one we have in ignorance. After all, any instance that may seem out of sorts for publicness is leveled-down, and a recognition of the error of “I” would be such an instance. This is definitely a case in which ignorance can be said to be bliss, given that, as Heidegger continues forward in his text, one's discovering the Self is a complex and a difficult task, and it seems to be far easier to be wrong and just shout “I”.
The comfort that the they seems to provide is progressed further by disburdenment and accommodation. When Dasein is disburdened, it is relieved of agency, as “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself...”. In surrendering to the they, Dasein has been relieved of accountability seeing as it can invoke the they to be answerable for its activities. It's in this sense of being invoked that the they accommodates Dasein by disburdening it from accountability. This accommodation is a comfortable position for one to be in as one is enabled to always “pass the buck”, and, seemingly, be justified in concluding that one's actions aren't one's own. It is by these measures, including leveling-down, that Sartre was inspired to bring forth his notion of “Bad Faith”, in which he criticized such behavior as being self-deceptive. Sartre's stance was one of absolute free will: “Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.” (Being and Nothingness) Sartre's own investigation into the meaning of Being saw instances of Bad Faith as a problem, given that free will is an absolute, one commits oneself to accommodation and disburdenment freely, i.e., one chooses not to choose. Although Sartre's total account of Being doesn't exactly line up with Heidegger's, both envision that Dasein (or in the case of Sartre, the “For-itself”) has the capacity to phenomenally escape the clutches of the they, and to authentically take account of oneself.
How Dasein Steps In: Solicitude
The interpretation of the “they-self” as a way of Being-with that Heidegger presents gets back to his question of the “who” only in regards to the everydayness of Being-with-one-another. It is in the everyday sense that the question is answered. The scope of this essay is to keep to the analysis of the they-self, but as mentioned above, Heidegger believed that one can escape the they and take hold of oneself, to authentically Be-one's-Self, a mode of Being that he thought to be an existentell modification of the they. Haugeland considers such a state to be like that of “juggling competing properties”, and that when Dasein succeeds in doing so, it is in the mode of confronting conflicts and resolving them. Haugeland saw this mode as being a higher-level disposition of self-criticism, a mode considered to be on the complete opposite side of the spectrum from disburdenment and accommodation. On the side of the latter we simply “slide,” to take the path of least resistance, and concern ourselves with only those most immediate of issues. We forget, or level-down, those that are not immediate, out of one's ontic proximity, and temporarily out of sight. While on the side of self-criticism we don't let some dispositions override others, instead we resolutely alter or eliminate dispositions. It is in this sense that Haugeland interpreted authenticity as self-ownedness, i.e., getting one's act together.
While Haugelands interpretation of Heidegger gives a nice glimpse into the implications of Authenticity, the particulars of which require far more detail than what can be allowed here. However, there is a state of Dasein's Being that is bound up with its authentic Being towards itself, and that is solicitude. We are to understand “solicitude” as corresponding to “concern”, for they are both interpreted in terms of care, the difference being that concern is a character-of-Being that Being-with can't have as it own. What concern has in its sights are objects, and thus is involved with things ready-to-hand, while solicitude is a character-of-Being through which Dasein as Being-with comports itself as towards those entities whose Being is like that of Dasein. In other words, solicitude is a state of Dasein's Being whose issue is with the Being of Others.
Heidegger introduces us to solicitude by its modes of deficiency. Such states include Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, and not “mattering” to one another. Each of these different ways of solicitude, which are understood as deficient and indifferent modes, characterizes everyday Being-with-one-another. In this sense, the Dasein-with of Others is barely, if at all, distinguishable from the ready-to-hand. If we are to take the Dasein-with of Others as something ready-to-hand, as a piece of equipment, then my angry-at-hammer scenario would hold as little consequence to the hammer as it would to a person whom I may decide to pick up and throw against the ground because he didn't assist fulfilling my ends. Is this not the same dilemma that we face in the work place, when bosses and managers, who are concerned solely with profits, look past those “things” that are serving their ends so long as they are functioning? What is the usual response that such management has to those “things” that interrupt their goal? They're fired of course, and it is not the ready-to-hand that a boss fires, but a Dasein-with of Others that has been mistaken for something ready-to-hand.
Deficiency implies the adequate, and as it concerns the adequate mode of solicitude, there are two possibilities. The first of which can be said to be a leaping in, in which Dasein jumps in for the Other and takes over that which he or she may be concerned with. This may have the appearance of help, but it is in fact a way in which the Other whom one leaps in for is dominated. Care is taken away in this form of solicitude, and the Other can either step back and watch as you take care of something for him, or the Other can simply disburden himself from the task at hand. Since the Other is in a state of concern regarding the ready-to-hand, and is also in the position of disburdening a thing or event from itself, the Other in this sense is most likely in the thralls of the they, and thus is in a very vulnerable position to be leapt in for.
The other mode of solicitude is to leap ahead of the Other in its existentiell potentiality-for-Being. In this mode Dasein is not taking care away from the Other, rather, it is to give it back to the Other so as to make him aware of his potentiality-for-Being. To distinguish this from leaping-in, leaping-ahead can be seen as a master and student type of relationship. The master isn't so much molding the student to be a particular way that might not be of the student's choosing, instead the master, who is wise to many ways of life, is helping the student's disposition to be open to various possibilities, each of which the student in turn will choose for himself. This sort of solicitude pertains to authentic care, and it assists the Other in a way that allows him “to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.” (159)
“The Pond Dilemma” and the Belief Of Well-Being
Given what has been presented in regards to the they-self, and authentic solicitude, I will briefly present two ethical views, one of which originally presented by Peter Singer, the other by Mylan Engel, Jr. Both should exhibit how being consumed by the they, and appealing back to the they endangers our ethical standards and beliefs.
In his article,”Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer describes a situation in which he is going about his business, headed to lecture to be exact, when he notices a small child has fallen into a pond and is in danger of drowning. Would anyone deny that he ought to wade in and pull the child out? Apart from saving the child, the consequences of his rescue are simply that his routine is disrupted. As it may be imagined, any instance in which the they is disrupted from everydayness, usually by something uncanny or abnormal, in this case a drowning child in a pond, the Dasein-with whose Being is care comports itself toward averageness, and in order to acquire or maintain average everydayness, Dasein-with has the essential tendency to level-down. This implies that the pond dilemma, as disruption to his lecture, will be evened out among a variety of norms so that the possibility of attempting rescue gets obscured in the mix of activities that the they prescribes in order to better retain its dominion. Dasein, whose being has been taken away by the they, does not have it potentiality-for-Being disclosed to itself, but rather it it is prone to disburdenment. The they, which constantly accommodates, will hold Dasein in a position in which it will rescue the kid only in the instance that rescuing is advocated as a norm by the they. If the latter be the case, then it may seem as though the they-self may still be able to achieve some ethical ends, but it does so in the absence of authentic solicitude. As it said before, the they answers the “who” of everyday Being-with-one-another, not of authentic Being-one's-Self.
One may wonder what the problem is, so long as the kid was saved what does it matter if it was the they-self that instigated it, or authentic Dasein? With the former, as Dasein has surrendered to the they, it is disburdened from accountability and can always invoke the they to be accountable for one's agency. In this particular instance we can imagine that it is a social norm to save a child from drowning in a pond as decided by the they, but what if the they had prescribed things differently? The problem here is that nothing changes in Dasein's compliance; conformity as compliance is accommodating for Dasein. We can't get upset at the bloke who didn't rescue the child, and due to the accommodating they, we can't get upset at anyone for the incident seeing as the “who” of everyday Being-with-one-another is answered as “nobody”; Dasein as “nobody” is not accountable for its actions. Of course we can say ontically that there was someone present to the child as he was drowning, but if the entirety of the this scenario is understood within the grip of the they, not only is it that “nobody” doesn't rescue the kid, but there is also “nobody” to criticize the indifference. When I suppose that “we can't get upset,” the “we” that I'm presuming is from an authentic state of solicitude, in which we understand the well-being of the Other as a potentiality-for-Being. This solicitude is vacant in the they, seeing as potentiality-for-Being is an authentic state-of-Being for Dasein, a state in which it understands itself in light of its possibilities. In the instance of leveling-down we're left to ask what possibilities?
As it is the they that decides the fate of the drowning child, we can only hope that the they have prescribed matters to be in the child's favor. The problem of the pond dilemma as taken to be an incident contained within the confines of the they is that one can only do as they do. I should hope that the scope of this problem will be taken into account as such that we can imagine many like scenarios in which the well-being of the Dasein that is in each case I myself, or the Dasein of another, may be threaten, and its well-being is taken into account only if the they prescribes it as acceptable to do so. If the they should prescribe indifference towards the child, then our dismay can only come from being extracted from the they, a state that is achievable as prescribed by Heidegger, Sartre, and Haugeland. Th latter offers self-criticism as a glimpse of Heidegger's notions of Authenticity, and by Sartre's doctrine of Bad Faith we are given a proposition that places Dasein in a condemned state of accountability.
As the pond problem was interpreted in regards to everyday Being-with-one-another, the point of departure for Engel's proposition is one that is extracted from the they, but the problem here is the appeal back to everydayness. In his article, “Hunger, Duty, and Ecology,” Engel refers back to Singer's pond example, but more for the use of drawing out a belief that those who are morally affluent are likely to oblige. The belief is simply that a world with less unnecessary suffering is better than a world with more unnecessary suffering. He interprets most moral arguments as being troublesome for people because they usually impose onto them things that they don't want to do, an example of this is animal rights arguments. Arguments advocating that animal welfare ought to be considered troubles most seeing as it imposing that one do something that one may not want to do, e.g., not eat meat. Engel's position is different, however, in that he does not seek to impose any of his beliefs onto you, instead he seeks to show that it is your very own beliefs that commits you to certain moral obligations. His argument strings together a collection of beliefs that one may have regarding the well-being of others, and if one agrees to believing in the collective whole, then one is committed to the “moral obligatoriness” of one's own beliefs.
The string of beliefs is long and I will not recite them all here, but one of which was stated earlier regarding our tendency to advocate less unnecessary suffering over more unnecessary suffering. He notes that one is obliged toward this belief in a manner that is of no great detriment to oneself. Being as such, if one is poor, and barely has the funds to feed oneself, then it would be irrational to believe that he ought to donate towards famine relief (Engel's aim). As it pertains to those of us that are actually able to donate a small portion of our salary at no great cost to one's own well-being, then there is really nothing obstructing one from committing to one's own belief. However, it's quite possible that the knowledge of Others suffering elsewhere may come as a major inconvenience as it concerns one's daily routine. I'm sure nobody wants their latte purchase to be interrupted with the consideration that one could abandon their purchase and instead donate the $4 to a famine relief organization. As we are conceiving of Dasein's Being-with in this instance as initially one of authentic solicitude, the problem occurs when knowledge of those suffering elsewhere comes as an inconvenience, and seeing as it is one's very own beliefs on the matter that is making one's potentiality-for-Being apparent to oneself, Dasein may find the they's constant accommodating as all too tempting. Dasein in this instance may feel overwhelmed with its very own potentiality, and as such, may resort to an appeal to publicness. Much like the pond, Dasein may become alleviated from its own beliefs if it chooses to duck for cover within the they-self where it will be met with the graces of disburdenment and accommodation. As Dasein has made it imperative to appeal to the they in this instance, it does so not only to obscure its potentiality-for-Being from itself, but also as to run from its ability to consider the well-being of Others, to run from authentic solicitude. As such, the truth of the belief regarding the well-being of Others is not in question, but rather confirmed, and this gives Dasein all the more reason to run as it is not willing to incur interruption onto its everydayness.
Self-Criticism As a Way To Account For Well-Being
Going back to Haugeland's self-criticism, he thought that when Dasein is in the position of “juggling competing properties,” it has the option to either slide into the path of least resistance (everyday Being-with-one-another), or to confront conflicts and resolve them (authentic potentiality-for-Being). As we did not go into the details of authenticity as Heidegger understood it, we viewed Haugeland's brief interpretation of authenticity under the state-of-Being that is Self-criticism. Looking at Engel's proposition of “moral obligatoriness”, we have a scenario in which Dasein, who observed the belief with dismay by means of authentic solicitude, may feel tempted to fall back into the they seeing as solicitude in this way is the most difficult to sustain. This is greatly due to such solicitude is carried out apart from the they, and as such, one is completely accountable for one's involvements, no appeal can be made to the they as to whether an interruption to the routine should be addressed or not. If one should choose not to address it, Dasein as authentic Being-one's-Self is answerable to what has been nullified in its potentiality-for-Being, and Dasein is Guitly! of said nullity.
In the juggling alluded to by Haugeland, Dasein has two roles to consider, two potential ways of Being. The first of which is to be the one who “enjoys one's lattes on a daily basis”, the other to be one who “gives up at least one latte to donate to famine relief”. We do not have to consider either role as better than the other, but what Haugeland suggests with juggling is a higher-level disposition of self-criticism that entails the Dasein does not simply let some ways of Being override others, but instead to resolutely alter its ways of Being or eliminate them. Either way, Dasein in this regard is self-owned, and as such, frees itself to better consider the well-being of Others.
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