The
environment we're born into began as a great mystery, and as a
terrible threat. Similar to our fear of shadows when we're children,
early humans were fearful of what they didn't know. Who knew what
lurked in caves, and in the bosom of thick forests? Questions
concerning an unknown environment led the imagination to conjure up
many threats towards human vitality. The earliest humans created
stories in order to appease their tender minds, stories that
contributed to their understanding of the elements around them as
well as for its reasons for certain movements and events. However,
simple stories could not allow us to rest comfortably forever, and
something more had to be done in order for us to be able to silence
our fears: the environment and its inhabitants had to be subdued. The
term “conquer” may come with a certain malevolent tone for some,
but there are those who feature it not only as a positive aspect of
the human parade, but also a necessary one. In the event of
conquering conditions, a certain set of relations is established, the
most primary being a class of rulers, established by conquering, to
have control over the remaining population, those who have been
conquered. This paper will explore Kant's notion of Enlightenment as
the most positive, beautified state of conquering conditions, and
offer a critique through the work of Adorno and Horkheimer as to why
even the most beautiful state of rule is less removed of fear, and
more infused with violence.
Kant's proposition for a state of enlightenment is man's overcoming of a self-imposed nonage.1 The term “nonage” is defined as one's inability to exhibit understanding without the guidance of another. In addition to this, enlightenment is also to establish a stage of relations between authority figures in a society, and the working masses. Certain authorities rule by imposing nonage onto the people, and as such, are not enlightened thinkers. Enlightenment is attained by both authorities and the masses (consisting of individuals) when each acknowledges a certain level of freedom that an individual has to think for oneself. The dilemma for Kant is to establish what an enlightened society ought to look like, or what it is for authorities and the masses to address each other in an enlightened manner.
Kant's proposition for a state of enlightenment is man's overcoming of a self-imposed nonage.1 The term “nonage” is defined as one's inability to exhibit understanding without the guidance of another. In addition to this, enlightenment is also to establish a stage of relations between authority figures in a society, and the working masses. Certain authorities rule by imposing nonage onto the people, and as such, are not enlightened thinkers. Enlightenment is attained by both authorities and the masses (consisting of individuals) when each acknowledges a certain level of freedom that an individual has to think for oneself. The dilemma for Kant is to establish what an enlightened society ought to look like, or what it is for authorities and the masses to address each other in an enlightened manner.
Focusing
first on the individual in the grip of nonage, this can come as
either self-imposed, or imposed by an exterior force, the latter
being an instance of the abusive guardians (though I'm sure there are
more localized instances of abuse, such as peer pressure). In the
case of self-imposition, Kant states that this occurs due to one
permitting fear and indecision to take hold over oneself. In this
case, one is more unwilling, rather than unable, to think for
oneself, and would much rather have someone else take care of matters
for them. On the other side of the nonage coin, there are those who
are unable to think for themselves due to the abusive disposition of
authorities. Kant cites dogmas and formulas as types of tools that
can bear reasonable utility, but in the hands of the given
authorities they are dependence-inducing instruments that cause the
masses to feel that authorities are meant to decide matters for them.
The reason these tools have such a function in the hands of despots
is that criticism against these foundations is forbidden, and one
must simply obey. There is no freedom to criticize the rules of
authorities, and as such, the possibility of enlightenment is
smothered in both the unable, and the unwilling. Authorities have
also smothered it in themselves seeing as enlightenment is the
overcoming of nonage, not the imposition of it.
For
Kant, it's clear that a level of freedom must be given to the masses,
by authorities, in order for enlightenment to flourish. A few
examples are given of the discourse of those authorities that rule by
nonage, one is the pastor who exclaims [do not argue—believe], and
this is contrasted with the statement of, what Kant phrases as, the
only one ruler: “Argue as much as you please, but obey!”
Only those who are willing to recognize the need of the masses to
express criticism towards rules and laws are fit to rule. This type
of ruler who orchestrates order by means of enlightenment due to
recognition of the need for both citizens and authorities to
establish relations with each other by both being able to
surpass nonage.
The
freedom that an enlightened ruler makes available to citizens, and
enables the development of enlightenment, is not absolute freedom.
Kant recognizes that some parameters of restriction are necessary in
order for a society to sustain itself. Within the scope of
enlightenment, there are two kinds of reason that must be employed by
the citizen that aid in sustaining an orderly society. The first is
the public use of reason that involves using reason as a means
of criticism before the public. The second is private use, and
this concerns the use of reason in accomplishing one's civic duties.
Private use can be viewed as reason employed by a professor, for
example, that aids in performing the requirements of the job. This
style of reasoning does not question or criticize the job, seeing as
this may hinder it, but does its best to fulfill the specific tasks
at hand. Public use is where criticism comes in, where a professor
expresses discontent with particular aspects of the job, and makes
such notions available to the public for them to form opinions of
their own on the matter. Thus for a society to surpass nonage, and
achieve enlightenment, its ruler must be willing to have the courage
to rule in a manner that does not restrict freedom of thought, and is
simultaneously able to administer command. For the individual, one
realizes the importance to follow command and exercise private reason
to best carry out one's civic duty, while also appreciating the need
to express free thought if one feels criticism of command to be
imperative.
Adorno
and Horkheimer believe there to be very little difference between
enlightenment and myth: we have not left story behind us and we are
still very much afraid of anything foreign to the self. Their
definition for enlightenment is quite general stating it as an
advancement of thought, a liberating endeavor for humans from the
fear that a mysterious environment arouses.2
The aim of enlightenment is to disenchant the world, to repel its
sense of mystery by means of discovering how it works. In this regard
enlightenment sounds very similar to science, and the two authors
often equate the two. However, it is the thought that "discovery"
is the means by which we as humans advance ourselves that is under
scrutiny. Discovery is the means by which practitioners of myth
thought themselves to understand the world. This term, much like how
it was for myth, is a disguise by which enlightenment attempts to
distinguish itself from myth. What we take to be discovery, Adorno
and Horkheimer consider more of a fanciful projection by which we
mean to achieve control over that which provokes fear in us, both the
environment, and each other.
Despite
Adorno and Horkheimer's general definition of enlightenment being
somewhat different from Kant's social schematic definition, it's not
difficult to see Kant's in light of the two authors'. Kant proposes
is a liberation from nonage, a state that gives itself over to fear
seeing as one is relying on persons and factors that are not in one's
own control. In this sense, one is enchanted by figures of authority
and lends oneself over to whatever story the ruling class decides to
concoct. The public use is meant to get at the root of how our social
environment works, to disenchant. The mysterious environment begins
to lose its threatening facade once we take to examining it. Language
developed as a useful tool of examination, symbol as an aspect of
language that is meant to serve as representation for the discoveries
of our examinations. Adorno and Horkheimer note of how shaman,
priests, and sorcerers were key figures in organizing symbols to best
construct a unified picture of reality. Not everyone had access to
picture construction and a reliance on the expertise of special
practitioners set a social hierarchy in place: a large portion of a
group's population is reliant on the word of a minority.
Knowledge,
which is what a state of enlightenment believes to attain, is power,
or a type of control. By devising explanations for certain events, we
give way to a course of manipulation. Examination once gave way to
explain why plants grow from the ground: there is an item we will
call a “seed” that has a force to produce an object that
protrudes from the ground we will call a “plant”. Having such
symbols for objects in the world strips them of their mystery, and we
can attach a story to each of the items to explain a certain event.
Now we need not feel afraid of plants because not only do we know how
they come about, but we also know how to make use of them. It may
seem that the manipulating takes place at the functional level of the
objects at hand, but really the manipulation is the initial naming of
the objects. In producing symbols to shrink back the mysterious tone
of the world, an expression of power was made, and whoever controls
the symbols has the power. To name the objects and then produce a
story to indicate function is to organize the manner in which others
will act, that is, if one can get them to take the story seriously.
For a priest to state that a particular act, place, or event is taboo
is to paint a picture by which the priest is able to invoke
punishments on those who violate the taboo. Fearful of punishment,
the masses are given a picture of what their rational options are,
which entails obedience to the priest.
What's crucial to keep in mind is that the authorities that Kant
feels comfortable with are those that hear the people, and due to
which, have their ability to command justified. What Adorno and
Horkheimer seek to undermine is that the current means of
enlightenment to establish rule is not founded by objective logical
calculation, but by a monopolization of symbol and story by a select
few. Objective calculation is just one story amongst many to organize
the people, and it's not that this story is the most true, but that
its advocates did the most violence to competing stories so as to
make salient that all the rest are just stories. The obedience that
the public use cannot trespass against is a barricade that separates
the masses from shaman and sorcerers. The public may criticize the
magic that organizes society, but they are in no position to wield
it. One may object and think this a false analogy, but one must ask
oneself if the temperament of the shaman are any different than that
of kings, or current politicians: we cannot make direct alterations
to the constitution, but must go through the politician to do so, who
has more direct access to constitutional construction and alteration.
We have the option of putting in a name on the presidential ballot
other than those of the major political parties (of which there are
only two really), but for the most part who would take those names
seriously? Society has operated so well against the threat of mystery
due to the current story(s) that keeps rulers and the masses in their
respective places, and that it seems practical we trust those few in
office to be the best of all possibilities; no one could have run
California like Schwarzenegger did. In this way enlightenment
succeeds by an estrangement, not only of people from the environment,
but also from each other.
In
the fight against mystery, all elements outside the grip of
manipulation have to be eradicated. Like other logic driven systems,
this aspect is key to Kant's enlightenment as well. Making fact the
symbols of “seeds” and “plants” is one instance of
manipulative control in which we give ourselves over to calculation
and prediction. “Each ritual contains a representation of how
things happen and of the specific process which is to be influenced
by magic.”3
We consider ourselves creatures of reason and science, but so did our
ancestors. Their science was magic, and both do the trick to dispel
mystery. Both practices think themselves as being involved in
discovery. A good part of what goes into making an aspect of our
experience that of discovery is to make the elements of our
environment calculable. Calculation gives way to prediction, and even
the most supernatural of myths, such as the abduction of Persephone,
allows audiences the comfort of prediction of the seasons.
Calculation
is not restricted to the environment, but is also applied towards
people. Designating public and private reason as two aspects of
rational citizenship that allows for calculation on an individual
level. These two faculties give the appearance of freedom for the
citizen, and they are also the means by which the masses remain
calculable to each other, and more importantly, to rulers. Conquering
conditions depend on manipulation entailing calculation. Kant's
enlightenment is not utterly ruthless, especially in comparison to
other totalitarian states in history, Nazi Germany being a primary
example, but what both states share is an emphasis on obedience. This
obedience is supported by the notion that those in office are owed
it, and it serves in the interest of the masses to give it so as to
strengthen the practice of calculation—our liberation from a
shadowy landscape of mystery. In the interest of self-preservation,
obedience is our best means of survival.
Public
and private reason are two conditions by which obedience is best
maintained. Giving emphasis to these two conditions allows for a
calculation of the masses: what counts as admissible behavior. “Each
human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different
from all others, so that it could all the more surely be made the
same. But because that self never quite fitted the mold,
enlightenment throughout the liberalistic period has always
sympathized with social coercion.”4
Part of what constitutes a successful battle against mystery is
unification, an important product of calculation. Conquering
conditions are weakened by differentiation, and what Adorno and
Horkheimer believe helps to suspend the state is to concoct the
notion of the self so as to administer what fulfills a socially
proper self. Institutionalizing proper conduct creates a means to
punish differentiation and prevent any instances of mystery from
popping up from within society's walls.
Both
nonage and public/private reason, are supportive of a state of
enlightenment, but what Adorno and Horkheimer propose is that
enlightenment, as it has developed, is a great violence against the
masses. Freedom from nonage seems to have benevolent consequences,
but it's simply because we think in terms of consequences, or ends,
that we reify the practice of calculation, that when placed in the
hands of rulers results in the manipulation of the masses. Much like
how we symbolize seeds and plants for functionality, rulers symbolize
certain states of self as being acceptable and civil, and others as
disorderly and unacceptable. Kant's tale may appear to instigate
liberation, but like our ancestors, it is the attempt at liberation
from mystery, which comes at the cost of estrangement from both the
environment and each other. It is to the advantage of rulers that
conquering conditions hold to maintain a distance from the
proletariat, and the best means to do so is to reify the story that
they are unique enough for authoritative positions.
Fear
feeds trust as nonage liberates us away from a threatening
environment, and into the hands of authorities. Benjamin notes how we
have done well to mark with disgust those arts that feature
inadequate rulers, and that [in the baroque the tyrant and the martyr
are but the two faces of the monarch.]5
Most interpretations of Odysseus’s clash with the Sirens involve a
heroic twist of inventive craft, to tie himself up and deafen the
workers to avoid death by their call. The acceptance of the tale
rides off its opposition to the baroque tyrant, and how it assists
appraisal of enlightenment. However, Adorno and Horkheimer consider
Odysseus to be the perpetrator of social violence. The restriction
imposed by Odysseus was to prevent the workers from hearing the call
of self-annihilation. Only Odysseus allowed himself to hear the
splendor of the call because even he desires to be free from the
practices of fear, but not so much that he wouldn't hear without
physical restriction. Conquering conditions require that their be a
subject of subordination, and the self was concocted to be that
subject.
If
there is any solution to be had in Adorno and Horkheimer, it is quite
ambiguous, though I interpret this as their intention. The strength
of the ambiguity is that its not to be taken as a truth claim, and as
such does not mean to pertain to discovery or calculation. What is
proposed is a style of thought that looks to get out from under such
manipulative faculties. This thinking involves admitting to oneself
the desire to rule as a response to one's fears. [Only thought that
does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter myths]6,
a style of thought that answers the Sirens and allows for a type of
self-abandonment, and loss of self-preservation seeing as the latter
causes one to be inclined toward calculation, both in its use and
acceptance.
1Kant,
“What Is Enlightenment?”
2Horkheimer,
Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. "The Concept Of Enlightenment."
Dialectic of Enlightenment. [New York]: Herder and Herder,
1972. 1. Print.
3"The
Concept Of Enlightenment." 5.
4"The
Concept Of Enlightenment." 9.
5Benjamin,
Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. London: Verso,
1987. Print.
6"The
Concept Of Enlightenment." 2.
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